Echoes from the Past

The History of Technical Representatives and Radar

(Part One)

Go to Part Two

July 2007 - By Dave Trojan, NATEC Technical Representative Detachment Kaneohe

Technical Representatives are arguably the least known individuals involved with radar during the Second World War and beyond. It is only very recently that surviving members have been traced and their contributions documented. This story provides a more detailed history of Technical Representatives and how they contributed to radar and other equipment maintenance and training. 

This story was compiled from numerous interviews, NATECINST 5400 Command History, Naval Aviation News articles, NAESU the First 50 Years video, and web site searches.

The story of radar use by the U.S. Navy begins way back in 1941.  Following the proven success of radar in Britain, there was a rapid increase in radar installations in aircraft in the United States. 

Thousands of radar sets were rushed into service and installed on numerous aircraft models.  As the installations were completed, Naval Aviation was forced into an expanded and challenging era of maintenance.

There was a huge demand for trained radar personnel to operate and maintain these radars.  In 1941 radar and electronic warfare were new technologies, understood by few. Everything about radar was completely new. 

It was a bit like learning on the job, both for the aircrew (who operated the equipment), the ground crew (who maintained the system) and the scientists themselves, who were also learning the needs of the aircrew. 

There was no civilian counterpart to this technology and no convenient labor pool the military could tap into for technicians. 

Fleet personnel were not trained in radar use and Navy technicians lacked installation knowledge and experience.  The basic problem in developing a new system is to put the person who knows what can be done technically in touch with the person who knows what needs to be done militarily.  Qualified experts were needed that could assist and train the military on the new radar equipment. 

The accelerated development of radar and the paramount need for the rapid introduction into service without the usual preparations that would be made in peacetime caused many technical problems. The Navy realized the shortage of skilled technicians needed to operate and maintain complicated electronic equipment severely crippled the country's war fighting capabilities.

“Radar Will Win the War,” Drawn for PHILCO, printed in Life Magazine 1944  

Radar operators require a good deal of theoretical knowledge and experience to be effective and they need to be able to tell whether or not their equipment is working at optimum. Operators must also know the capabilities and limitations of radar in general, lobe characteristics, bearing accuracy, maximum and minimum dependable ranges, and requirements for target discrimination. 

Furthermore, in order to gain the maximum tactical advantages from radar, the operational techniques must change as the situations change. 

The early displays were quite difficult to interpret. Early pulse radars operated with a wide beam and had no discrimination. If the radar pulse hit something, anything, it came back and showed up on the display. 

Pipology evolved and entailed the study and interpretation of all types of contacts seen on radar indicators.  Radar operators were in a critical position that could cost the lives of their crews if they made a mistake. Operating squadrons having recently been equipped with new radar systems were in dire need of assistance if the weapons were to be effectively utilized.

World War Two Radar Operator 

  The Navy initially turned to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) for help in training radar operators. 

On 26 June 1941, fifty officers were detailed for training in the inspection and maintenance of radio and electrical equipment to the new radar school at MIT.

These officers were to become the Navy’s first specifically trained radar operators. The early radar operators not only operated the equipment, they were required to make all necessary repairs to keep the radar sets in working order. 

Experience with trying to use radar operationally forced military units to depend heavily upon in-service training. Only by training on the job did it prove possible to keep up with the demands of the ever-expanding electronic systems into which new and improved equipment was repeatedly introduced.

MIT radar receiver laboratory 1941

Steps were taken to resolve problems with electronic systems in naval aircraft beginning in early 1942.  As early radar equipment was reaching the Fleet, it soon became apparent that it was necessary to provide fleet personnel general information on aircraft radar characteristics.

The Bureau of Aeronautics Radio and Electrical Section prepared and published a confidential registered publication beginning in April 1942. This classified publication was continually revised and kept up-to-date. 

Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics Newsletter dated 15 December 1942

The Bureau of Aeronautics attempted to resolve installation problems by establishing a Systems Planning Board made up of engineers to consider and make recommendations on the problems of installing and using electronic equipment in naval aircraft.

This functional organization was divided into two groups.  The first comprised the technical subsections that were responsible for project engineering of individual items of electrical and electronic equipment.  The seven technical subsections were Radio Communications, Accessories, Navigation, Advanced Communication Design, Radar, Radio Control, and Electrical.

The second comprising the aircraft installation desks, the engineers of each being responsible for manufacturing liaison with aircraft manufacturers on problems relating to the actual installation of this equipment in aircraft of their specifically assigned type. 

As a further implementation to the Systems Planning Board, provision was made for the establishment of "Engineering Type Groups" for each new airplane.  These engineering type groups were charged with the responsibility of producing the necessary detailed information leading to proper installation of equipment in the aircraft. After the engineering information was completed, civilian engineers and Navy personnel worked together to install the equipment properly.

 The Systems Planning Board established, in May 1943, the system of listing equipment recommended by the Radio and Electrical Section in the form of a numbered directive.  These directives were submitted to the class desk and to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations for approval. After approval the directive was issued to all interested activities for action and initiation of necessary procurement. Also during this period the "Radio and Electrical Assembly Sheet" was established. The Radio and Electrical Assembly Sheet was in effect a specification for procurement purposes. It listed all components required for a specific installation of a given type of equipment.

To facilitate the installation of radar equipment, the policy of dividing radar equipment into groups of parts evolved.   Originally the airplane contractors did not consider the classified radar equipment as an integral part of the airplane and considered the radar equipment merely an attachment that they knew nothing about and had no concern with.

A Bureau of Aeronautics letter to the Bureau of Ships, on 19 April 1942, requested that all contracts for radar provide for separation into three parts: Group A, consisting of plugs, shock mounts, and accessories to be delivered to the airplane manufacturer for installation; group B, containing all confidential parts, basic equipment, components, instruction books, and operating spares; and group C, consisting of bulk spares.

This became standard procedure and facilitated the program of having the airplane contractor install as much of the electronic equipment as possible consistent with security considerations and reduced the load on naval activities, which completed the installation by installing the group B parts. This system lasted for more than two years until radar training for contractor personnel was finally begun in a course convened at MIT on 21 August 1944. Soon afterwards the Radio and Electrical Branch of the Bureau of Aeronautics initiated the first contract change to provide for contractor installation of electronic devices as a coordinated system in the basic airplane design.

The U.S. Army Air Corps had their own enormous problems with radar maintenance and training.  In the beginning, airborne radar sets had a very low reliability record. Initial operational performance by the microwave sets was dismal.  Barely 5% of the radar sets would operate for an entire bombing flight.  Operators were poorly trained and the maintenance was insufficient. Maintenance was often performed in centralized locations to maximize resources.

A B-24 radar maintenance technician recounted how radar equipment was serviced and repaired during WWII.   “The ‘line men’ would go out to those planes that had radar and test-run the radar set through a prescribed procedure. Any malfunctioning unit was brought to the radar shack, where the more experienced shop technicians would perform the repair.

Radar operators also used the radar shack as a classroom to discuss problems and operation with the radar technicians and to familiarize the newly arrived operators with the procedures.” Aircrews learned to distrust early radar and some found it useless.

Standard maintenance procedures were put into action in the U.S. Army Air Corps.  Separate areas were designated for the repaired units using a green tag and the awaiting to be repaired units using a red tag.  The red tags had to explain the problem the lineman had found, and he was required to sign the tag. A log was kept for all red and green-tagged units.  The aircraft maintenance personnel worked up to shop (radar) technician rather quickly, since the need was great and there were few qualified personnel. It was quite common that once personnel were qualified on the radar equipment, they were transferred to other units, since the use of radar technology was growing and the military was expanding its servicing system. 

Test equipment, spare parts and instructional manuals either did not exist or were in very short supply.  A typical radar shop during the war had sparse test equipment including: work benches, oscilloscopes, multi-meters and hand tools. The power (28-volt DC) for testing the radar sets came from portable gas-driven generators (called Waukeshaws after their manufacturer).  The portable generators were shared with the aircraft linemen to supply power to the aircraft while doing the ground test runs. Instruction manuals never kept pace with the constantly modified equipment. 

Military radar technicians, operators, and civilian field engineers from the equipment manufacturers often got together for joint problem solving as they became familiar with one another’s concerns.  Reengineering of the radar systems was ongoing. In one example, fuses often blew during in-flight, which would disable the radar. The fuse block in its original position was impossible to change in-flight.  The technicians relocated the fuse block to make it accessible for the operators, who could then replace fuses as needed. 

This example illustrates how problems were analyzed and an improved maintenance method was found using cooperation between the aircrews, maintenance personnel and the equipment manufacture field engineers. As time passed more efficient bench repair and test operations were also implemented. By the end of the war, through hard work by maintenance technicians and help from civilian field engineers, the radars were operating reliably during the entire flight 95% of the time. Radar had proven itself a valuable technical tool.

Marines hard at work in their squadron’s Radio-Radar Shop, Marine Bombing Squadron Six-Thirteen (VMB-613), Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, 1945, ensuring that each aircraft's radars and communications equipment functioned properly

            The biggest problem the Navy had was finding and training personnel for electronics work.  The shortage of Navy trained maintenance personnel was critical. The need for Navy airborne radar technicians during World War Two was apparent and urgent. Peacetime methods of recruitment and fleet introduction of technicians were not sufficient and could not be followed at the beginning of the war.  

The lack of technical ability was a major handicap for many volunteers. During World War Two, fewer than half of Navy recruits had completed high school, and about a third of them left school after the eighth grade.

Before Pearl Harbor, the Navy fed its advanced schools with handpicked graduates of commercial radio schools.

After Pearl Harbor the Navy grabbed up recruits at recruiting offices, tested them in mathematics, electricity, shop practice, and radio looking for candidates.

To attract maintenance personnel to the radar technical specialization, they were offered incentives such as specialized training and advancement.  Even with all the incentives it was still very difficult to find qualified technicians. One of the problems was getting a security clearance. 

It took about two months of background investigating to be accepted and many an aspiring technician was turned down for reasons they never knew.   Navy recruits interested in becoming a radio and radar technician had to pass the Eddy Aptitude Test.

Commander Eddy

Those who were successful received the radioman rating and then entered the Eddy Program in Chicago named after Navy Captain William Crawford Eddy, a radar specialist who commanded the radio and radar school near Chicago, the Navy's highly secret and unusual radar training program during WWII. 

Mr. William Crawford Eddy knowing the Navy would need radar training offered the Navy Department his staff and facilities of Chicago's first experimental TV station W9XBK as a training school a week after Pearl Harbor.

At the time only about 100 Chicagoans owned TV sets.  Prior to WWII, Mr. Eddy had served ten years as a submarine commander before the Navy discovered he was deaf and medically retired him in 1934, but not before he had invented the Eddy Amplifier, a highly sensitive submarine sonar detector that put sound on a dial where he could see it.  Mr. Eddy returned to duty in World War Two to command the Eddy Program and the Radio Chicago School.  The first Navy primary class in aircraft detecting devices began in March 1942. 

The students lived at the Naval Armory, a half a mile away, worked nine hours, six days a week, five hours on Sundays, and crammed in another two hours of "homework" nightly. 

After 90 days at W9XBK the Sailors moved on to other advanced schools near Washington D.C, Norton Heights Conn., or San Francisco.  The school became such a success that similar classes were set up all across the country.  Originally estimated to train 135 technicians, the total came closer to 86,000. 

Practical Radio Theory Radioman School, US Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois during World War Two

Thousands of young persons went through the Navy electronics-training program by the end of the war.  Young men were trained as radio/radar technicians during a 10 to 15 month course.

The average instructor-student ratio was an impressive 1-17. For the officers of some schools, even this relatively low ratio was not good enough.

The officer in charge of the Electricians Mate School, for example, demanded a ratio much smaller. He didn't have a problem with 1-17 in the classroom, but considered that shop work in his school required one instructor for every six students.

One student remarked, “When you work 12 to 14 hours a day, you get a lot of schooling in six months." Barely a third of those who started the Navy electronics-training program ever completed it because they were required to attend school six days per week and study into the night.

 Richard Spath, an Electronic Technician Third Class during WWII, remembers repairing the radar on the Navy's PB4Y-2 planes.

He said, "They always needed the radar repaired quickly, so the planes could return to the skies and sometimes we worked very long hours." He also said that they were constantly trying to improve and modify the radar. He also later wrote the radar training and instruction manuals the PB4Y-2 pilots used. Richard said, "My training in the Captain Eddy's radar school prepared me well for these jobs."

Recruiting pamphlet for Radio Technician (RADAR) Training, Nov 1944 

The Navy produced a number of recruiting posters to entice young men to enlist for radar training 

Northrop P-61 Black Widow nose radar maintenance checks in the field

            Electronics training was further complicated by the secrecy factor during World War Two.  The radar manuals and equipment were classified.  For example the magnetron, which was the heart of the radar unit, was kept in a safe. During class, an armed guard would bring a magnetron into the room. They were allowed to look at it, but they could not handle it. When class was over the guard would have the instructor sign a form and the mysterious item was locked away.

When they did get technical publications of Radar equipment they were given a brief case attached to their wrists by a handcuff type device to carry it in. This brief case was never to leave their presence except when locked in a vault or safe.  This highly secret aspect made learning and using radar much more difficult and slow. They were constantly checked by security agents and followed. 

Their rooms were inspected when they we were not there and if anyone left his brief case in his room, and an agent found it, the result was instant dismissal.

A graduate of the Navy electronics training school remembered that on the day of graduation an admiral stood up and addressed them by saying, “You understand how to maintain,' which means fix, `every piece of equipment in the United States Navy through which an electron flows.”

The technicians then reported to the fleet, whether it was a ship, submarine or an airplane. Upon arrival they were immediately able to go in and examine the most complicated pieces of equipment and repair them.  In those days, they had to take the time to remove the cover, go in and try to find the faulty vacuum tube or other problem. Electronic equipment during the time period contained many vacuum tubes and lots of wiring.  They did not have sufficient spare equipment or parts. 

Everything was a priority and when something broke, it was repaired not replaced.  The training overall was excellent; the problem was they just did not have enough trained technicians and graduates fell far short of the demand. Something was needed to help fill the gap.

     During World War Two, in every zone, on every carrier and military airfield, from the Arctic to the tropics, Technical Representatives (Tech Reps) from various aircraft and equipment companies served alongside the military to evaluate and maintain their equipment.  The first Tech Reps were liaisons between the equipment manufacturers and the Navy on problems relating to the maintenance of their equipment. 

Major aircraft manufacturers including Lockheed, Boeing Aircraft Company, Curtis Wright Aeronautical Corporation, Bell Aircraft, North American Aviation Corporation, and United Aircraft Industries dispatched Technical Representatives to support their aircraft in the field. Field Engineers were also supplied to the Navy by major electronic equipment manufactures, including Philco, RCA, Raytheon, and General Electric.

Shoulder Sleeve Insignia for AAF Technical Representative used in WWII.

Issued primarily to civilians working for companies supplying equipment to the AAF, this patch came from a WWII Boeing Aircraft Co. employee, measures 2.5" by 3"

            Civilian Technical Representatives supporting military activities wore special insignias to identify their status. Those operating with U.S. Forces during WWII, particularly overseas, often wore military clothing with other insignia indicating their function. 

Unique devices including hat badges, pocket hangers, and collar devices were also used.  Civilian employees of the U.S. Army Air Force (AAF) were allowed to wear a modified uniform under specified conditions to identify their status and function. 

The original regulations (Change One to 1941 AR 600-35 issued 4 September 1942) authorized a special sleeve insignia with a white triangle with the letters U.S. in blue on a blue square 4 1/2 inches in size for civilians having a noncombatant status.

 Another change (Four of 23 October 1942) authorized a similar insignia with a red triangle for those with a combatant status. Under what circumstances the War Department believed that a civilian could claim combatant status would be interesting to know.

The original designs were replaced in November 1944 with a blue triangle for both combat and noncombatant status.

Charles Lindbergh (2nd from left) on Emirau Island May 1944

Perhaps the most famous of the Technical Representatives during World War II was Charles Lindbergh. When Lindbergh, as a “Tech Rep” for United Aircraft’s Chance Vought Division, wanted to go to the Pacific, the Navy was more than willing and agreed with him that his status should be exactly like that of any other Technical Representative.

His mission was to “study the performance of fighter planes under combat conditions” and to improve their design and the designs of newer types. To his logical mind, there was only one way to study a fighter plane “under combat conditions” and that was to fly on combat missions.

Lindbergh went on many missions in F4U Corsairs, took part in strafing raids, flew cover for bombers and did some special bombing to show just what a F4U Corsair could do. He then sent reports back to Vought for the engineers to study.

Lindbergh also was interested in finding out how other types of fighters functioned and so he obtained clearance to do some observing with the Army Air Corps in New Guinea. There he got acquainted with the Lockheed P-38 and again soon found himself accepted as just another Technical Representative, who also was a top pilot. With the Air Corps, he found another way to be useful. After one of his first missions in New Guinea, mechanics checking planes discovered that Lindbergh had more fuel left than the pilot of any other ship in the squadron.

This happened regularly. When this information sifted up through to the high command, Lindbergh moved, at General MacArthur’s request, from group to group instructing in fuel conservation and illustrating his lectures by flying with the squadrons.

His work was credited with lengthening the range and tremendously increasing the usefulness of the P-38 for long-range bombing escorts. His efforts enabled P-38 fighters to shoot down a Japanese bomber that was carrying Admiral Yamamoto, the architect of the attack on Pearl Harbor.  Altogether he spent six months in the Pacific, made fifty combat missions, put in 178 combat hours, and returned to Connecticut with complete reports on fighter planes, their performance, and their problems.

Pocket Insignia, U.S. Technician, United States Navy, WWII

            To accelerate the transition of equipment designed at the Naval Research Laboratory to operational status in the Fleet, several special liaison groups sprang up. These liaison groups linked Naval Research Laboratory researchers and the industrial contractors who produced the equipment with the Navy personnel who would use the equipment. 

The Navy also wanted their own Technical Representatives, who specialized in all types of radar electronics. In response to the challenge, on 31 December 1942, the Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics requested that the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington D.C provide personnel capable of assisting fleet units in the installation, operation and maintenance of radar equipment. Aeronautical manufactures supplied technical field men to the Naval Research Laboratory for that purpose. 

This special group developed within a few months into the Airborne Coordinating Group (ACG), which provided trained civilian electronics specialists to fleet units throughout the war as a solution to the shortage of trained Navy technicians. 

The pool of highly trained specialists provided services to requesting activities wherever and whenever needed.  Their job was to troubleshoot breakdowns and failures in all airborne electronic devices, come up with corrective measures, and perform maintenance.

The equipment included Radios, homing beacons, radar searching and jamming equipment, identification equipment, and other specialized airborne electronic equipment. Throughout the war years, ACG field engineers carried the skills developed at the Research Laboratory into all theaters of conflict and provided the knowledge necessary to solve problems encountered with early electronics.

            The Navy's Airborne Coordinating Group personnel working in conjunction with U.S. naval forces when in forward areas were issued standard naval officer uniforms suitable to the climate and location to which they were assigned in order to establish their official and noncombatant status. The only distinguishing difference was that they had gold colored ACG letters on their shirt collars and an insignia worn on the left pocket of the naval officer's uniform coat or shirt. The insignia badge is three and one-quarter inches square and comes in a white or blue version appropriate to the uniform. 

All Technical Representatives had officer's privileges and were supposed to conduct themselves accordingly.  They were often mistaken for officers, especially in the early days when the group was not well known.   

One of the Navy’s first Airborne Coordinating Group Technical Representatives out in the field was Mr. Roscoe Phillips from the Philco Corporation.  He was assigned to a composite Navy air squadron sent to the south Atlantic to hunt German U-Boats that were a doing serious damage to shipping crossing the Atlantic. He had the honor of working and flying with the first airborne radar that the Navy used. 

 He recounted a story about the early days of the ACG.  “We had been in the south Atlantic for over two months before the carrier captain learned that there was a civilian aboard his boat. He immediately ordered that I be confined to the carrier until we put in to our port at Receife, Brazil, which we were due to reach in one week. This meant that I could not fly with the squadron or go ashore with them. When we reached port the captain took me with him to the naval headquarters where I was deposited in an outer office while the captain went into the CO's office to call Washington.

I never learned what Washington told him, but he came out a different man. From that moment on he showed me the utmost respect. In fact he invited me to eat at his private mess so often that it began to effect my relations with the enlisted technicians that I worked with. They began to suspect that I was not a civilian Tech Rep but an officer in disguise, snooping on enlisted activities.  During my tour down there, this captain ordered that I install one of the aircraft Radar units on the super structure of the carrier, since he believed that our radar was better that the one the carrier used.

To my knowledge this is the only time that radar for aircraft was installed and used by a Navy aircraft carrier.”  Mr. Roscoe Phillips stayed with the navy air squadron in the South Atlantic for over a year before he was finally ordered to return to Washington D.C for assignment to the Pacific Theater.

Motoyama No. 1 airfield on Iwo Jima in March 1945,  A Black Cat from an unknown squadron stands ready for rescue duty for the B-29's that were damaged and couldn't make it back to Iwo Jima.  20th Air Force B-29's are in the background

A Navy Aviation Chief Radioman (ACRM) named Jack Corcoran recounted a story from World War Two about how he had a memorable and rewarding association with a Technical Representative from the Navy's Airborne Coordinating Group while on Iwo Jima in the spring of 1945. The Technical Representative Electronics expert couldn't have appeared at a better time because the Navy radioman was under considerable technical and political duress.

“Most of the Navy aircraft that came under us (USN Combat Aircraft Service Unit 52) for electronic maintenance had been retrofitted with a new and improved IFF transponder. These sets worked like gangbusters when they first appeared but, as time wore on, they began to falter.  By this time (late spring of 1945) the Army had taken over housekeeping' status from the Marines on Iwo Jima and had implanted some long range P-51's and P-47's for the purpose of B-29 accompaniment during the Japan raids from the Mariana’s and also as defenders of our private rock.  The Army (AACS) operated the
island search radar and ATC facilities - such as they were.

As our newish IFF's began to age and fail, the Army’s island radar rotating atop famed Mt. Suribachi picked up an ever-increasing number of apparent "bogeys."  The Army folks would then scramble P-51's or P-47"s to go and shoot down the "enemy" intruders in "our" airspace.  Alas, when they intercepted the aircraft in question, it turned out to be - too often - a lumbering Navy patrol bomber with a non-functioning IFF transponder. Now, this upset the Army aviation fraternity to no-end as these scrambles often came during nocturnal hours or - worse yet - during beer call - or while a USO troop was performing at the open-air Lava Theater.  And since the senior Army cat was some grade of General while our leader was a lowly Navy Commander, the stuff did, indeed, roll down hill. In fact, it rolled right down to where I was doing my best to rehabilitate recalcitrant IFF units.

The gear was classified; no color codes on the wiring, the manuals pretty thin and our Quonset hut test setup not exactly space age.  Anyway, despite our most valiant efforts many of the sets would not play.  Whether they wouldn't squawk or wouldn't code properly is now lost in the depths of time.

Anyway, while struggling away at the bench one balmy evening (I never insisted on overtime pay), a pleasant gent in an odd-ball uniform (a standard Navy officer’s uniform but with special sleeve patches for the Airborne Coordinating Group with ACG cap insignia) strolled up and introduced himself as Roscoe Phillips, Philco Corporation, assigned to the Navy's Airborne Coordinating Group.  I drew a blank, having never heard of that outfit.  The affable newcomer outlined his group's mission and asked whether we were having any problems with airborne electronics equipment.  I allowed as how we sure did and asked if he knew anything about this dratted IFF gear, pointing to a disassembled unit on the bench.  He replied that he had some background on it and would be glad to give me a hand.

This, he did - and in spades.  It turned out that the IFF's innards were unusually sensitive to tube characteristics. It was loaded with 6AQ5 tubes, and they all tested great on the old Hickock tube tester - known to all as a pretty worthless device.  Unfortunately, as Roscoe pointed out, brand-new ones often failed to function in-circuit.  To weed-out the rogue examples, he had developed a special 6AQ5 test setup.  When he plugged one into its place in the circuit, a certain scope pattern had to show on the external test scope.  If not, dump the tube.  We went through cartons of tubes, tossing out the "bad" ones, installed the ‘survivors’ and everything began to snap and pop. Within a short time, about 3 days, the revitalized sets began to "check-out," and bogies became history.  Roscoe was an immediate hero with the radio/radar gang.”

“Later, we learned that, Roscoe had other even more practical talents which served to further increase his stature. He had developed a booklet containing internal re-wiring connection diagrams for almost every 24vdc electrical motor used on Navy B-24's and PB4Y-2 Privateers.  The purpose being to adapt them for use on 110 VAC to drive locally fabricated bunk fans.  Soon, most everyone privy to his tech info had a locally-made fan whirling above his rack.” Shortly after Nagasaki, Mr. Roscoe Phillips went off to Japan, left the ACG program and became Chief Engineer for the Armed Forces Network.  This story vividly illustrates how tech reps took on all types of technical issues to complete the mission. Information was often lacking from the maintenance manuals.  The Tech Reps in the field often had to invent new ways of getting the job done. 

 The ACG grew rapidly, in January 1943, there were approximately 30 civilian contractor technicians and a few Navy technicians, and by the end of the year there were 140.  By the end 1944 the demand for service led the ACG to grow to over two hundred civilian contractor technicians and 60 Navy technicians.  Personnel assigned to the ACG could move around pretty much as they thought necessary and could request orders wherever they wished to go. They usually spent between two and four months at a location, but sometimes much longer. When they felt that their work was done at a particular location they could request a return to Washington for a new assignment. Between assignments they returned to home base for refresher training on the latest equipment modifications.  The men of the ACG carried out about 1,000 field missions around the globe during World War Two. A shipboard version of the ACG, the Electronic Field Service Group of 325 officers, enlisted men, and civilians, did the similar tasks for shipboard electronics, which involved a far more extensive inventory.

All ACG personnel were required to send monthly reports to Washington reporting in detail their work and problems with equipment.  The ACG engineers provided Navy technicians with a short alternative communications route by using the technical reports to state the problems, give background information, and offer a recommendation.  These reports provided a wealth of technical information and served to bring them to the attention of the cognizant authorities.  This procedure enabled the Navy and equipment makers to change or modify whatever electronic devices were causing trouble with the least delay. Many times equipment changes, spare parts and revised tech manuals were in the field within one month of reported problems.

The Enola Gay prior to bombing mission on Tinian Island 

            One former British Technical Representative played an important part in ending World War Two.  The British trained Edward L Martin as a radar maintenance technician who served with the British Civilian Technical Corps, the British equivalent of the Airborne Coordination Group prior to America entering the war.  He later served with distinction as a radar maintenance technician with the U.S. Army Air Corps during World War Two. 

He ended up as a Lieutenant Radar Maintenance Officer with the 313^th Air Bombardment Wing, Twentieth Air Force on Tinian Island. His duties concerned the repair and maintenance of the radar equipment of the nine hundred B-29 Super fortress bombers based there. One of these aircraft was the Enola Gay, the B-29 that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima.

The role of Navy Technical Representatives evolved over time.  On 1 December 1944 the Electronics Tactical Training Unit was established at NAS Willow Grove. They trained personnel of the Airborne Coordinating Group as instructors in the operation of all newer types of airborne electronics apparatus, including search, navigation, identification, and ordnance radar. Later it was recognized that the contributions by these civilian radar technicians was so great that those who served in combat areas of the Pacific during World War II were granted veterans affairs benefits.  The ACG command was further established and solidified during the immediate post war time frame by the addition of civil service personnel.  On 4 June 1948 the Airborne Coordinating Group was renamed U.S. Naval Aviation Electronics Service Unit (NAESU), which more accurately described its mission of supporting all types of airborne electronics equipment.

Mr. Arnold E. Acker served as a civilian Tech Rep radar specialist with the Navy's Carrier Air Group II aboard several aircraft carriers during the Korean conflict working on the first practical military radars and microwave systems

            A major source of Technical Representatives came from former military personnel.  After being discharged from the military after World War Two many technicians went on to careers with major electronic companies that later contracted them back to the Navy Department as Tech Reps.

After completing two combat tours in Korean waters with Amphibious Forces, Pacific a Navy enlisted man, ET1 Birchard Lee Kortegaard was planning to ship over for the joys of the Mediterranean Fleet. While waiting at San Diego he saw an ad by Philco Corporation in a newspaper for "Field Engineers" with wide experience in military radar and communications equipment. 

He said “Navy Techs are a little like fighter pilots in that we also think we're the best, so I took the qualification examination, really just for fun”.  He could hardly believe it when they offered him a position as a Philco Technical Representative at the Civil Service rank of GS-12, equivalent in pay and privileges to a Major. 

He took a discharge instead of shipping over, bought the MIT Rad Lab Principles of Radar book and in two months was back in the Pacific, at Clark Air Base in the Philippines, an "expert" on Radar.  He had spent practically every waking moment of those two months absorbing MIT's book and a host of other Radar Technical Manuals at Philco's radar school and actually did consider himself an expert. Astonishingly, within a few weeks of arriving at Clark AFB he designed a field modification for their failing target position display scopes (PPI's) and received a Letter of Commendation.

Another Tech Rep reported how he was a field engineer for the RCA Service Company during 1950-56.  Mr. Louis C. McClure Sr. was contracted to the Navy Department, Bureau of Aeronautics, in Washington, D. C. and was assigned to the Naval Aviation Electronics Service Unit, (NAESU) at the Naval Receiving Station, in Washington, D.C.  He normally operated solo, moving from one facility to another on military orders. He traveled throughout the United States and Pacific areas assisting squadrons with electronics problems in naval aircraft.

NAESU Field Engineer, Mr. Kapeghiam is shown here wearing a summer uniform while attached to FASRON-119 in the Philippines in 1955

During the 1950’s NAESU engineers were initially assigned to training classes as required to gain experience on actual Navy equipment before being sent to work with the Fleet staff electronics officers.  

A pool of Field Engineers was established for each of the twelve major Navy and Marine Corps air commands.  There were usually several Field Engineers assigned to a service group.  Force or Fleet air commanders then sent these out to Fleet activities when there was a requirement for engineering services. 

 By 1955 NAESU had nearly two hundred Field Engineers available in the command. Most were specialists in electrical and electronic aircraft systems. 

Another group of NAESU engineers specialized in shop planning for aviation electronics requirements aboard aircraft carriers and tenders and were stationed at various shipyards. The concept of overhaul and repair flow line methods for electronic equipment repair began with NAESU engineers.   

NAESU Field Engineer Mr. Kendall times the engine start, while the thumbs up signal are given to a VF-24 pilot as the Cougar jet begins to turn up in this photograph from 1955 

In one example from 1955, a gray suited NAESU Field Engineer glanced at his stopwatch and noted the time required for the engine start.  The operation was a success after he assisted in making adjustments to the NC-5 Power Unit after two earlier failed attempts. 

The Field Engineer then gave squadron personnel additional instruction on the maintenance of the electrical relay system of the power unit and a refresher on jet engine starting procedures. 

NAESU Field Engineers contracted for by the Bureau of Aeronautics helped naval activities make better use of their complex and expensive equipment.   Much of the progress in solving early jet aircraft starting problems can be attributed to the efforts of NAESU Field Engineers.  

            In some instances NAESU engineers were assigned projects that required extended field evaluations of new equipment being introduced into the Fleet.  In one example new UHF radios were installed in over one hundred squadron aircraft for evaluation. 

After carefully controlled field evaluations, with emphasis on squadron maintenance methods, operating characteristics and installation difficulties, the tests resulted in more than a hundred equipment changes and improvements.

            Some interesting demands were made on the skills and ingenuity of individual engineers.  Early examples included an urgent requirement for lightweight radios that would enable ground officers to communicate with helicopter pilots in Korea.  NEASU engineers modified an existing life raft radio set. 

The successful model was then used a pattern for similar installations in other helicopters operating with the Fleet.  Another field engineer developed a method of paralleling two radio crystals, each with a slightly different frequency, on each of the regular radio channels of a fighter aircraft radio.  This was done to meet an urgent need for additional tactical communication channels for Marine air support operations.   These innovations lead to improvements in air-ground coordination and close air support during the Korean War. 

NAESU’s Field Engineer Mr. Dunklee explains the maintenance and routine upkeep of a Martin P5M Marlin Intercom System to AT3 Thomas of FASRON-110 in 1955

In January 1959 the Secretary of the Navy changed the name to Naval Aviation Engineering Service Unit (NAESU). 

Their mission was expanded “To provide field engineering assistance and instruction to Naval Aviation Activities in the installation, maintenance, repair and operation of all types of aviation systems and equipment”.

The change was based on the general deterioration of basic readiness conditions and a growing shortage of technical personnel in the Fleet.  Part of this increase represented engine, airframe, and component engineers. 

Over the years, the technical assistance provided by NAESU Technical Representatives included every facet of Naval Aviation, from the electronics that guided the aircraft, to the wings that supported the aircraft while in flight, to the engines that provided the power and to the Ground Support Equipment used to maintain the aircraft.

As technology developed and became more sophisticated, Naval Air Stations located throughout the world realized the critical need to have continued on site support by the NAESU technicians.

To handle the extensive demand for technical support, NAESU expanded to 492 Field Technicians by 1962. In 1966 the Naval Air System Command established NAESU as the major supplier of Engineering Technical Services for aviation maintenance support. Also during 1966 the number of Civil Service personnel increased from 27 to 242 due to the conversion of contractor technical services personnel to direct hire civil service.  For 55 years NAESU was under the command of the Naval Air Systems Command, and for over thirty years, headquartered in Philadelphia. 

A Tech Rep working on F-4C radar in Vietnam

A Boeing Technical Representative named John Dullighan, who served four years with HMM-165 on CH-46s Sea Knight helicopters, recounted his experiences during the Vietnam War.

An older Field Engineer who served during WWII told him that he would learn more in two years in the field than he would learn in a lifetime in the Boeing plant. He jumped at the chance to go to Vietnam. 

“My time as a Tech Rep was the most interesting and intense period of my life and I wouldn't have missed it for anything. In Vietnam you couldn't call the factory, the guys wanted an answer now and they wanted to fly the airplane if they possibly could. Boeing decided to recruit engineers.

They offered a two-year tour, with at least 6 months in Vietnam. They were looking for guys about 30, old enough to know their trade but young enough to do what was needed and willing to make decisions.

” He was 31 when he went to Vietnam. “I don't think I've ever seen a job description for a Tech Rep. I used to define my job as ‘Whatever kept the CO and the guys happy and kept them from killing themselves.’  It was a 24/7 job and it helped to be passionate about it. 

I learned a ton in the field, professionally and personally.  I learned that I had no problems making decisions and living with them.  I relearned that you lead by example that you have to put your money where your mouth is, especially with the Marine Corps.  I learned that your reputation precedes you, especially in a small organization like Marine Aviation.  You only get one chance to screw up, so be sure that you don't.”

End of Part One, Part Two Coming Shortly